State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina and Ex Parte Communications Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule: The “Judicial Proceedings” Split by Sheffner, Daniel J.
 71 
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PARTE COMMUNICATIONS UNDER THE HIPAA 
PRIVACY RULE: THE “JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS” 
SPLIT 
Daniel J. Sheffner* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina,1 the Supreme Court of Missouri held 
that the Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy 
Rule does not authorize court orders permitting defense counsel to enter into 
informal ex parte communications with a plaintiff’s treating, non-party 
health care provider, absent the plaintiff’s authorization.2  In overruling the 
trial court’s order allowing such ex parte communications, the 2010 decision 
comports with the majority3 of state courts that prohibit such informal 
discovery techniques.4  Notably, however, the Missouri court did not rest its 
holding on any state substantive rule expressly prohibiting ex parte 
communications, but on the court’s interpretation of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule.5  The Proctor court is the only tribunal that has held that the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule, as opposed to state substantive law, does not authorize such 
communications, pitting itself against many sister state courts that have 
interpreted the HIPAA confidentiality regulations to the contrary.6 
Following surgery in 2004, Bobbie Jean Proctor brought suit against 
Dr. Timothy L. Blackburn, Kansas City Heart Group, P.C., and St. Joseph 
Medical Center, alleging medical malpractice.7  On motions filed by the 
defendants, on June 17, 2009, the trial court issued an order authorizing Mrs. 
Proctor’s non-party, treating health care providers to meet and communicate 
informally with defendant’s attorneys ex parte.8  The order stated, in part, 
                                                                                                                 
*  Law Clerk, Honorable Kenneth J. Meyers, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, Southern District of Illinois. 
1.  320 S.W.3d 145 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
2.  Id. at 155. 
3.  David G. Wirtes, Jr. et al., An Important Consequence of HIPAA: No More Ex Parte 
Communications Between Defense Attorneys and Plaintiffs’ Treating Physicians, 27 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 1, 2 (2003). 
4.  See Melissa Phillips Reading & Laura Marshall Strong, Ex Parte Communications Between Defense 
Counsel and Treating Physicians—Has HIPAA Really Changed the Landscape?, FOR THE DEF., 
Oct. 2011, at 33.  
5.  See Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 157. 
6.  Reading & Strong, supra note 4, at 34. 
7.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 147. 
8.  Id. 
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TO: All Hospitals, Clinics, Pharmacies, Physicians, Social Workers, 
Educators, Psychiatrists, Psychologists, Therapists, Governmental 
Agencies, (State and Federal); All Other Medical Institutions, Practitioners, 
Health Care Providers, Past and Present. 
. . . . 
You are further notified that, pursuant to federal and state law, counsel for 
the defendants are hereby authorized to talk with Bobbie Jean Proctor’s 
treating physicians or other health care providers, without counsel or the 
parties, including the plaintiff, being present or participating, provided the 
health care provider consents to the interview.9 
The court also “enter[ed] a qualified protective order consistent with 45 
C.F.R. [§] 164.512(e)(1)[(v)].”10  
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the order invalid, writing that the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule does not authorize informal, ex parte communications 
between defense counsel and a plaintiff’s non-party treating physician.11  The 
court, after issuing a preliminary writ of prohibition, ordered that the writ be 
made absolute.12  The Supreme Court of Missouri granted transfer and, in a 
unanimous decision, upheld the appellate court’s order.13 
Part II briefly explains “ex parte communications” as used in this 
Article.14 Part III examines the HIPAA Privacy Rule and 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.512(e)(1)’s “judicial proceedings” exception to the general prohibition 
of the use or disclosure of protected health information absent patient 
authorization.15  Part IV discusses the Proctor decision and the general rule 
from the cases that hold, contrary to Proctor, that § 164.512(e)(1) authorizes 
ex parte communications.16  Finally, Part V explains that the Proctor decision 
comports with general public policy reasons that militate against interpreting 
the HIPAA Privacy Rule as authorizing ex parte communications, and 
supplies a better reading of § 164.512(e)(1).17 
II.  EX PARTE COMMUNICATIONS 
Ex parte communications, as used within this Article, are oral 
communications between defense counsel and a plaintiff’s treating, non-
party health care provider, without the presence of plaintiff or plaintiff’s 
                                                                                                                 
9.  Id. at 154. 
10.  Id. at 155. 
11.  State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, No. WD71326, 2009 WL 3735919, at *13 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009), 
transferred to, 320 S.W.3d 145 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
12.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 147. 
13.  Id. at 147, 158. 
14.  See infra Part II. 
15.  See infra Part III. 
16.  See infra Part IV. 
17.  See infra Part V. 
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counsel.18  Such communications are less expensive than formal discovery 
procedures and allow defense attorneys to elicit information from physicians 
or other health care providers in a more open environment than is provided 
by a deposition or through other formal discovery measures.19  Ex parte 
communications are, as such, a favored and oft used tool for defense 
attorneys in jurisdictions in which they are permitted.20 
Currently, a majority of states either prohibit ex parte communications 
between defense counsel and plaintiff’s non-party health care provider21 or 
place strict procedural restrictions on such communications that effectively 
render them prohibited.22  Courts holding that ex parte communications are 
prohibited do so for public policy reasons,23 the protection and maintenance 
of the physician-patient privilege,24 or the physician’s ethical duty of 
confidentiality.25  Other courts, however, have held that ex parte 
communications are permitted under their substantive laws.26 Courts 
upholding such communications have done so for a variety of reasons, 
including the public’s interest in reducing health care costs27 and because the 
patient is deemed to waive the physician-patient privilege when he or she 
places his or her injury at issue by bringing suit.28 
Accordingly, there is a state law split as to whether ex parte 
communications are generally permissible.  There is another, narrower split, 
however, as to whether the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule, as opposed to state 
law, authorizes such communications. 
III.  THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE  
Due to the increased use of electronic medical technology, the ever-
expanding size of the health care industry, and the varying levels of state 
                                                                                                                 
18.  J. Christopher Smith, Comment, Recognizing the Split: The Jurisdictional Treatment of Defense 
Counsel’s Ex Parte Contact with Plaintiff’s Treating Physician, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 247, 247 (1999). 
19.  Natalie Theresa Johnston, Note, Ex Parte Communications: Informal Discovery that HIPAA May 
Formally Eliminate, 37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 177, 177 (2013); Scott Aripoli, Comment, Hungry 
Hungry HIPAA: Has the Regulation Bitten Off More Than It Can Chew by Prohibiting Ex Parte 
Communication with Treating Physicians?, 75 UMKC L. REV. 499, 504 (2006). 
20.  Aripoli, supra note 19, at 504. 
21.  See, e.g., Crist v. Moffatt, 389 S.E.2d 41, 47 (N.C. 1990); Petrillo v. Syntex Labs., Inc., 499 N.E.2d 
952, 957 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Sorenson v. Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, ¶21, 177 P.3d 614; Bulsara v. 
Watkins, 387 S.W.3d 165, 170 (Ark. 2012); Hasan v. Garvar, 108 So. 3d 570, 572 (Fla. 2012). 
22.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02(5) (2013). 
23.  See Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 47. 
24.  See Hasan, 108 So. 3d at 574. 
25.  See Steinberg v. Jensen, 534 N.W.2d 361, 361 (Wis. 1995). 
26.  See, e.g., Morris v. Thomson, 937 P.2d 1212 (Idaho 1997). 
27.  In re Collins, 286 S.W.3d 911, 920 (Tex. 2009). 
28.  Aripoli, supra note 19, at 507. 
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protections of private medical information,29 the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS) promulgated rules in 2002 regulating the use30 and 
disclosure31 of protected health information (PHI),32 pursuant to 
congressional delegation contained in HIPAA.33  Recently amended in 
2013,34 these confidentiality regulations (the HIPAA Privacy Rule),35 serve 
as a federal floor, permitting state laws governing the use and disclosure of 
PHI that are comparable or more stringent.36  
As a general rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits “covered 
entities,”37 including most health care providers,38 from using or disclosing 
PHI without obtaining the patient’s prior written authorization or without 
giving the patient an opportunity “to agree to or prohibit or restrict” such uses 
or disclosures.39  Countervailing considerations, however, counsel against 
prohibiting wholesale the use or disclosure of PHI without patient 
authorization.  Therefore, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits covered entities 
to use or disclose PHI without such authorizations in many instances related 
to treatment, payment, and health care operations,40 as well as for numerous 
public policy purposes.41 
                                                                                                                 
29.  Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918-01, 
59919-20 (Nov. 3, 1999) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
30.  As used in the HIPAA Privacy Rule, “use” refers to, inter alia, a covered entity’s utilization of PHI. 
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2013) (definition of “use”). 
31.  As used in the HIPAA Privacy Rules, “disclosure” refers to a covered entity’s transferring of PHI 
to another entity.  See id. (definition of “disclosure”). 
32.  Id. (definition of “protected health information”).  Section 160.103 states: 
[PHI] means individually identifiable health information 
(i) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this definition, that is: 
(ii) Transmitted by electronic media; 
(iii) Maintained in electronic media; or 
(iv) Transmitted or maintained in any other form or media. 
 Id. 
33.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 101 Stat. 1936 
(1996).  Congress specifically delegated administrative authority to the U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services to promulgate rules concerning confidentiality and privacy protections with 
relation to health information in HIPAA §§ 261–64. 
34.  See Other Modifications to the HIPAA Rules, 78 Fed. Reg. 5566 (Jan. 25, 2013). 
35.  45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500-.534 (2013). 
36.  Id. § 160.203(b). 
37.  The term “covered entity” refers to (1) health plans, (2) health care clearing houses, and (3) health 
care providers “who transmit[] any health information in electronic form in connection with a 
transaction” prescribed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  Id. § 160.103 (definition of “covered entity”). 
38.  See id. (definition of “health care provider”). 
39.  Id. §§ 164.508(a), .510. 
40.  See id. § 164.506(b)(1). 
41.  Id. § 164.512.  The full list of public policy exceptions are as follows: 
 Uses and disclosures required by law. 
 Uses and disclosures for public health activities. 
 Disclosures about victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence. 
 Uses and disclosures for health oversight activities. 
 Disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings. 
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One such public policy exception is codified in 45 C.F.R. 
§ 164.512(e)(1). That regulation states, in part, 
(e) Standard: Disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings. 
(1) Permitted disclosures. A covered entity may disclose [PHI] in the course 
of any judicial or administrative proceeding: 
(i) In response to an order of a court . . .; or  
(ii) In response to a subpoena, discovery request, or other lawful process . . 
. , if:  
(B) The covered entity receives satisfactory assurance . . . that reasonable 
efforts have been made . . . to secure a qualified protective order . . . .42 
A “qualified protective order,” as referenced in subsection (1)(ii)(B), 
includes a court order that limits the scope of any disclosure to the purpose 
of the litigation.43 
Section 164.512(e)(1) therefore indicates that the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
permits covered entities to disclose PHI without prior patient authorization 
in certain circumstances pertaining to judicial or administrative proceedings.  
Few courts, however, have interpreted § 164.512(e)(1) with relation to the 
permissibility of ex parte communications.44  Of those that have, most have 
held that the regulation does not prohibit courts from ordering ex parte 
communications as long as such orders limit the scope of the disclosures.45  
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that § 164.512(e)(1) 
does not authorize ex parte communications,46 placing the Missouri court by 
itself in the “judicial proceedings” split. 
                                                                                                                 
 Disclosures for law enforcement purposes. 
 Uses and disclosures about decedents. 
 Uses and disclosures for cadaveric organ, eye, or tissue donation purposes. 
 Uses and disclosures for research purposes. 
 Uses and disclosures to avert a serious threat to health or safety. 
 Uses and disclosures for specialized government functions. 
 Disclosures for workers’ compensation. 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,462–
63 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164). 
42.  45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i)-(ii). 
43.  Id. § 164.512(e)(1)(iv). 
44. See Reading & Strong, supra note 4, at 31. 
45.  Id. at 33 (writing that the following courts determined that the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows ex parte 
communications: Robeck v. Lunas Constr. Clean-Up, Inc., No. 53576, 2011 WL 2139941 (Nev. 
2011); Baker v. Wellstar Health Sys., 703 S.E.2d 601 (Ga. 2010); Lowen v. Via Christi Hosps. 
Wichita, Inc., No. 10-1201-RDR, 2010 WL 4739431 (D. Kan. Nov. 16, 2010); Holman v. Rasak, 
785 N.W.2d 98 (Mich. 2010); Lee v. Superior Court, 177 Cal.App. 4th 1108 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); 
Holmes v. Nightingale, 2007 OK 15, 158 P.3d 1039; Arons v. Jutkowitz, 880 N.E.2d 831 (N.Y. 
2007); Reutter v. Weber, 179 P.3d 977 (Colo. 2007); Santaniello ex rel. Quadrini v. Sweet, No. 
3:04CV806(RNC), 2007 WL 214605 (D. Conn. Jan. 25, 2007); Roberts v. Estep, 845 S.W.2d 544 
(Ky. 1993)). 
46. See State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 155 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
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IV.  STATE EX REL. PROCTOR V. MESSINA AND THE “JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS” SPLIT 
If a state’s medical confidentiality laws are less stringent than the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule,47 or are silent on an issue as to which the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule speaks,48 the federal regulations control the court’s analysis.49  
Currently, a handful of courts have interpreted the permissibility of ex parte 
communications pursuant to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.  Of those that have, 
all save one has found that the most applicable provision, § 164.512(e)(1)’s 
“judicial proceedings” exception, does not prohibit ex parte communications.  
Subpart A discusses the Proctor decision, and Subpart B explains the general 
rule advocated by the courts on the other side of the split.  
A.  Proctor: 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1) Does Not Authorize Ex Parte 
Communications  
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court of Missouri, in Proctor, 
upheld the appellate court’s invalidation of the trial court’s order authorizing 
ex parte communications between defense counsel and plaintiff’s heath care 
providers.50  The court held that the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not authorize 
orders permitting informal ex parte discussions between a patient’s health 
care provider and defense counsel, and that in issuing such an order the court 
exceeded its authority.51  The Missouri Supreme Court first evaluated 
whether the HIPAA Privacy Rule preempted Missouri’s ex parte 
communication rules.52  Following this, the court determined whether 
§ 164.512(e)(1) authorized ex parte communications.53 
Examining the applicable law, the court found that Missouri law neither 
authorizes, nor prohibits ex parte communications; case law provides merely 
that plaintiffs may not be compelled to authorize ex parte communications, 
and a plaintiff’s physician may not be compelled to take part in such 
communications.54  The court held that the HIPAA Privacy Rule, on the other 
hand, does, absent exceptions,55 prohibit ex parte communications.56  The 
court therefore concluded that, although there was no preemption issue, 
                                                                                                                 
47.  45 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2013). 
48.  See Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 152. 
49.  42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a) (2012); Johnston, supra note 19, at 180. 
50.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 158. 
51.  Id. at 155, 158. 
52.  Id. at 147–53. 
53.  Id. at 153–57. 
54.  Id. at 150–51 (citing Brandt v. Pelican, 856 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Mo. 1993) (en banc) (reaffirming 
State ex rel. Woytus v. Ryan, 776 S.W.2d 389 (Mo. 1989)) (en banc))). 
55.  See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(a) (2013). 
56.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 152. 
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because there was no applicable Missouri law on point, the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule provisions controlled the analysis.57 
The court next determined whether § 164.512(e)(1), the applicable 
exception, in this instance,58 to the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s general 
prohibition of the unauthorized disclosure of PHI,59 authorized ex parte 
communications.60  The court determined the answer to this question by 
analyzing the meaning of the words “in the course of” and “judicial 
proceedings” as contained in § 164.512(e)(1).61  The court presumed that the 
words were used in accordance with their plain and ordinary meanings.62  The 
common understanding of “in the course of” a judicial proceeding 
“include[s] matters that occur while a case is pending in a judicial forum.”63  
The court interpreted “judicial proceeding” narrowly,64 as the phrase is used 
in Missouri’s criminal code, to mean a proceeding “authorized by or held 
under the supervision of a court . . . .”65  “Authorize” and “supervise,” as 
defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, mean, inter alia, “[t]o endow with 
authority or effective legal power, warrant, or right” and “[t]o have general 
oversight over,” respectively.66  
Based on the preceding definitions, the court determined that the 
language “in the course of a judicial . . . proceeding,” as used in 
                                                                                                                 
57.  Id. at 153. 
58.  The court noted that the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits ex parte communications between treating 
physicians and defense counsel when the patient issues an authorization pursuant to 45 C.F.R. § 
164.508(a)(1).  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 154.  Section 164.508(a)(1) states, 
Except as otherwise permitted or required by this subchapter, a covered entity may not 
use or disclose [PHI] without an authorization that is valid under this section.  When a 
covered entity obtains or receives a valid authorization for its use or disclosure of [PHI], 
such use or disclosure must be consistent with such authorization. 
45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1).  The court correctly noted that Mrs. Proctor issued no such written 
authorization.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 154.  Therefore, the court examined the applicable “judicial 
proceedings” exception contained in 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1). Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 153–57. 
59.  45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a). 
60.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 153–57. 
61.  Id. at 155–57. 
62.  Id. at 155. 
63.  Id. at 155–56.  The Court held that this comported with the dictionary definition of the phrase.  Id. 
at 156 (citing THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 389 (2d ed. 2005)). 
64.  The court interpreted “judicial proceedings” narrowly because it concluded that “a narrow 
definition is implicit in HIPAA’s regulatory requirement in 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1) . . . .” Proctor, 
320 S.W.3d at 156.  In support of this proposition, the court cited the following language, 
In § 164.512(e) of the final rule, we permit covered entities to disclose [PHI] in a judicial 
or administrative proceeding if the request for such [PHI] is made through or pursuant 
to an order from a court or administrative tribunal or in response to a subpoena or 
discovery request from, or other lawful process by [,] a party to the proceeding. 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 82,529 
(Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (cited in Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 156) 
(emphasis provided by the court)). 
65.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 156 (citing MO. REV. STAT. § 575.010(4) (2013)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
66.  Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 122, 1290 (5th ed. 1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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§ 164.512(e)(1), requires disclosures made under that exception “be [made] 
under the supervisory authority of the court either through discovery or 
through other formal court procedures.”67  Trial courts in Missouri do not 
have supervisory authority over informal proceedings, of which are included 
ex parte communications.68  Accordingly, the court held that the “judicial 
proceedings” exception does not authorize such communications,69 “and, 
consequently, a trial court has no authority to issue a purported HIPAA order 
advising the plaintiff’s non-party treating physicians that they may or may 
not participate in informal discovery via ex parte communications.”70  
Therefore, because informal ex parte communications are not 
authorized by the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the court affirmed the court of 
appeal’s invalidation of the trial court’s order to the contrary.71  In so doing, 
however, the court positioned itself apart from her sister state courts. 
B.  The Majority Rule: 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1) Does Not Prohibit Ex 
Parte Communications 
Missouri stands alone.  All other courts that have examined 
§ 164.512(e) with respect to ex parte communications have held that the 
regulation authorizes such communications.72  These courts generally hold 
that unauthorized ex parte communications between a plaintiff’s non-treating 
health care provider and defense counsel do not violate the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule so long as the communications are accompanied by a protective order 
limiting the scope of such discussions to medical information at issue in the 
case.73  Some courts only require assurances that the defendant has used 
“reasonable efforts” in securing a qualified protective order by the court.74  
In Holmes v. Nightingale, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that 
“45 C.F.R. § 1645.512 clearly anticipates the issuance of court orders 
allowing ex parte communications with physicians.”75  In Holmes, Theresa 
Lee Elam’s estate filed a malpractice suit against Interim Healthcare of Tulsa 
and St. John Health System, Inc.76 The trial court issued an order allowing ex 
parte communications concerning “any record of any health care provider[’]s 
care and treatment of [decedent].”77  The state high court determined that 
                                                                                                                 
67.  Id. at 156. 
68.  Id. at 157. 
69.  Id. 
70.  Id. 
71.  See id. at 158. 
72.  Reading & Strong, supra note 4, at 33. 
73.  See, e.g., Holman v. Rasak, 785 N.W.2d 98, 109 (Mich. 2009).  
74.  See Holmes v. Nightingale, 2007 OK 15, ¶ 16, 158 P.3d 1039, 1044.   
75.  Id. at ¶ 24, 158 P.3d at 1046. 
76.  Id. at ¶ 5, 158 P.3d at 1043. 
77.  Id. at ¶ 24, 158 P.3d at 1046 (internal quotations omitted). 
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§ 164.512(e)(1)(i) forecasts that ex parte “disclosures may be allowed where 
a court order so provides.”78  Therefore, the court held that, rather than bar 
ex parte communications, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits such disclosures 
as long as they are accompanied by “certain procedures,” including a 
narrowly tailored trial court order drafted in permissive language.79  The 
court, however, took issue with the court order’s overly broad permitted 
disclosures, as well as the absence of any statement assuring health care 
providers that they are not compelled to disclose the decedent’s PHI with 
defense counsel, and so, invalidated the order.80  
Some courts hold that the HIPAA Privacy Rule only requires that 
defendants use “reasonable efforts” to secure a court order limiting the PHI 
sought in ex parte communications to those at issue in the litigation.81  This 
view is based on subsection (ii) of § 164.512(e)(1), which states a covered 
entity may disclose PHI, 
[i]n response to a subpoena, discovery, request, or other lawful process that 
is not accompanied by [a court order], if . . . (B) [t]he covered entity receives 
satisfactory assurance . . . from the party seeking the information that 
reasonable efforts have been made . . . to secure a qualified protective order 
that meets the requirements of [§ 164.512(e)(1)(v)].82  
Based on this subsection, in Holman v. Rasak, the Michigan Supreme Court 
held that § 164.512(e) does not prohibit ex parte communications because 
such communications qualify “at least [as] ‘other lawful process[es]’” and, 
therefore, are permitted under the HIPAA Privacy Rule even absent a court 
order, so long as health care providers are satisfactorily assured that defense 
counsel has made “reasonable efforts” to receive a qualified protective order 
from the court.83 
Holmes and Holman represent the general approaches the majority of 
courts that have interpreted § 164.512(e)(1) with respect to ex parte 
communications have utilized.  They do not, however, comport with the 
general policy reasons that militate against judicial allowance of ex parte 
communications absent a patient’s authorization, nor do they exemplify the 
most straightforward interpretations of § 164.512(e).  
  
                                                                                                                 
78.  Id. at ¶ 11, 158 P.3d at 1044. 
79.  Id. at ¶ 31, 158 P.3d at 1044. 
80.  Id. at ¶ 28, 158 P.3d at 1046–47. 
81.  See Baker v. Wellstar Health Sys., Inc., 703 S.E.2d 601, 603 (Ga. 2010).  
82.  45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(ii)(B) (2013). 
83.  Holman v. Rasak, 785 N.W.2d 98, 100, 106 (Mich. 2009). 
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V.  PROCTOR, POLICY, AND PLAIN MEANING 
While the minority, Proctor was correctly decided.  By holding that the 
HIPAA Privacy Rule does not authorize ex parte communications, the 
Missouri high court complied not only with prevailing notions of public 
policy, but also with the most direct and plain reading of § 164.512(e)(1).  
For these reasons, Proctor provides a better rule than those embraced by 
Holman, Holmes, and the other courts in the majority.  Section A discusses 
the public policy rationales that align with the Proctor decision, and Section 
B discusses the regulatory interpretation issue. 
A.  Public Policy  
The court in Proctor issued a ruling that comports with many of the 
public policy rationales certain state courts have articulated when 
determining the validity of ex parte communications under their states’ 
substantive laws.  In particular, the Missouri court’s decision complies with 
the policies of protecting physicians from unfair penalties under a harsh 
federal penalty scheme, ensuring physician-patient confidentiality is 
respected, and favoring a level of fairness provided by the use of formal 
discovery procedures.  This Section discusses these rationales.  
The Proctor court’s reading of § 164.512(e)(1) comports with the 
general policy of protecting physicians from the risk of unfair sanctions 
caused by inadvertently divulging protected information during ex parte 
communications.84  While the Proctor court rested its decision on its 
interpretation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule, it also noted, at the end of its 
opinion, that 
[c]ompliance with [the] HIPAA [Privacy Rule] and this [c]ourt’s rules of 
discovery will ensure the disclosure of the health information and at the 
same time limit the potential liability of a treating physician who was 
prompted to provide [protected information].85 
In a decision issued pre-HIPAA Privacy Rule, the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina in Crist v. Moffat articulated multiple policy rationales that weighed 
in favor of barring ex parte communications, including that of protecting 
physicians from liability.86  In Crist, the North Carolina court feared that, 
either due to “inadvertence or pressure by the interviewer,” physicians might 
breach patient confidentiality and so open themselves up to tort liability or 
                                                                                                                 
84.  Crist v. Moffat, 389 S.E.2d 41, 47 (N.C. 1990). 
85.  State ex rel. Proctor v. Messina, 320 S.W.3d 145, 158 (Mo. 2010) (en banc). 
86.  Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 47. 
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even professional sanctions.87  Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, however, as 
noted in Proctor, unlawful disclosures may lead not only to state medical 
association sanctions or lawsuits instituted by former patients, but also, for 
example, fines up to $50,000, up to one year of imprisonment, or both, as 
provided by federal statute.88  Therefore, the Proctor decision provides much 
needed protection to health care providers, untrained in the law, who find 
themselves witnesses in malpractice actions and subject to possible federal, 
civil, and monetary penalties, by strictly limiting the availability of ex parte 
communications to those authorized by the patient. 
Other important public policy considerations that militate against 
reading § 164.512(e)(1) as permitting ex parte communications include those 
of physician-patient confidentiality and the suitability of formal discovery 
tools.89  Interpreting § 164.512(e)(1) as allowing ex parte communications 
engenders possible violation of the physician’s duty of confidentiality, as 
mentioned above, and is at odds with the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s general 
prohibition of the unauthorized disclosure of confidential information.  While 
Missouri plaintiffs waive the physician-patient privilege and the ethical duty 
of confidentiality regarding medical information at issue in the proceeding,90 
in refusing to read § 164.512(e)(1) as permitting ex parte confidential 
disclosures absent authorization, the Proctor court implicitly acknowledged 
the seriousness with which the HIPAA Privacy Rule considers the use and 
disclosure of PHI.  In so acknowledging, the Missouri court assured 
protection of both physicians, at risk of exorbitant fines or of imprisonment 
if found to have violated the HIPAA Privacy Rule, and patients, at risk of 
suffering from broad disclosures of confidential information, a risk 
compounded by the growing prevalence of electronic medical records, one 
of the main impetuses behind the creation of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.91 
The Crist court noted that use of formal discovery methods strikes a 
balance between permitting defense counsel to attempt to find all facts 
pertinent to his or her client’s case, while protecting patient confidentiality 
through the imposition of formal requirements, such as the presence of 
plaintiff’s counsel or court proceedings.92  In reading the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule as favoring formal discovery methods over the unrestrained use of 
informal tools, Proctor ensured that the balance identified by Crist is 
                                                                                                                 
87.  Id. 
88.  Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 158 n.9; 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(b). 
89.  Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 47. 
90.  See Proctor, 320 S.W.3d at 152; Ted Agniel et al., Ex Parte Communications with Treating Health 
Care Providers: Does HIPAA Change Missouri Law?, 63 J. MO. B. 296, 296–97 (2007). 
91.  See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 82,462, 
82,467 (Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) (providing examples of 
unauthorized medical record disclosures that proved the necessity of a federal medical information 
regulatory scheme). 
92.  Crist, 389 S.E.2d at 46. 
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observed in Missouri.  This guarantees a modicum of fair play in medical 
malpractice and other related fields of litigation, an especially important 
aspiration in an era in which the notion of protecting confidential health 
information is deemed sufficiently important to be codified in federal statute 
and regulations. 
Therefore, Proctor is in line with very important public policy 
rationales, which are even more relevant in the age of the HIPAA Privacy 
Rule. 
B.  45 C.F.R. § 164.512’s Plain Meaning 
Proctor is not merely correct on public policy grounds.  The Missouri 
high court’s decision also comports with the plain meaning of § 164.512(e). 
That courts such as Holman and Holmes utilize a more strained interpretation 
of the “judicial proceedings” exception only gives further support to the 
correctness of Proctor’s reading of the regulation. 
To summarize Proctor’s interpretation of § 164.512(e), the court 
determined that subsection (1) of that provision, which allows health care 
providers to disclose PHI “in the course of any . . . judicial proceeding,” 
means that PHI may be disclosed pursuant to formal discovery methods 
which, in Missouri, are utilized under the supervisory authority of a court. 
Because ex parte communications are informal discovery tools, they are not 
implicated by § 164.512(e)(1).  This construction, based on ordinary 
dictionary definitions of “in the course of” and “judicial proceeding,” 
correctly applied the canon of construction that a legislative act’s plain 
meaning “should be conclusive,” unless that meaning is found to be inimical 
to the drafters’ purposes.93  Proctor gives due respect to the most obvious 
reading of the regulatory language, and so, is the most reasonable 
interpretation. 
On the other hand, the interpretation supplied by the majority is not 
consistent with the most direct reading of § 164.512.  In her dissent in the 
Holman case mentioned above, Justice Hathaway of the Michigan Supreme 
Court provided a compelling counterargument to the interpretation that 
protective orders, or “reasonable efforts” to secure such orders, are sufficient 
predicates upon which to authorize ex parte communications. Justice 
Hathaway’s argument is based on § 164.512’s introductory paragraph. That 
paragraph provides: 
A covered entity may use or disclose [PHI] without the written 
authorization of the individual . . ., or the opportunity for the individual to 
                                                                                                                 
93.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (citing Griffin v. Oceanic 
Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). 
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agree or object . . ., in the situations covered by this section, subject to the 
applicable requirements of this section.  When the covered entity is required 
by this section to inform the individual of, or when the individual may agree 
to, a use or disclosure permitted by this section, the covered entity’s 
information and the individual’s agreement may be given orally.94 
As argued by Justice Hathaway, this language limits the availability of oral 
disclosures of PHI to those instances in which a patient is required to 
authorize, or be given the opportunity to agree or object to, the disclosure of 
PHI.95  Because the ex parte discussions at issue are primarily oral 
communications, the introduction to § 164.512 explicitly bars such 
communications from its reach, absent application of the heightened 
authorization or opportunity to object protections afforded by the HIPAA 
Privacy Rule.96  This interpretation is based on the plain meaning of the 
regulation and, thus, should be given effect over other, more strained 
interpretations. 
Proctor provides a plain meaning interpretation of § 164.512 that is 
properly tethered to the regulatory language and gives clearer insight into 
Congress’s and HHS’s intent than the majority of courts that have 
approached this question.  Along with Justice Hathaway’s dissent, Proctor 
provides the better answer to the question whether the HIPAA Privacy Rule 
permits ex parte communications between a patient’s treating, non-party 
health care provider and defense counsel when compared to Holman and the 
other cases’ artificial interpretations.  Together with its alignment with 
important public policy interests, Proctor provides the better rule. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 In holding that the HIPAA Privacy Rule does not by its terms authorize 
ex parte communications between defense counsel and plaintiff’s treating, 
non-party health care provider, the Supreme Court of Missouri placed itself 
in the minority.  The Proctor court’s decision, however, complied both with 
important public policy rationales related to the protection of health care 
providers from severe federal penalties (along with possible civil liability and 
licensing sanctions), the protection of harmful and unnecessary disclosures 
of confidential health information, and the procedural fairness that inheres in 
the use of formal discovery tools. Further, Proctor’s interpretation of the 
“judicial proceedings” exception of § 164.512(e) is more reasonable than the 
majority’s construction.  Therefore, Proctor provides the better answer to the 
                                                                                                                 
94.  45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2013) (emphasis added). 
95.  Holman v. Rasak, 785 N.W.2d 98, 112 (Mich. 2009) (Hathaway, J., dissenting). 
96.  Id. at 110, 112. 
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“judicial proceedings” split, and its analysis should be utilized by Missouri’s 
sister state courts. 
  
 
